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THE LEGAL COMMUNITY AND THE




Lawyers in cases involving injunctions against picketing repre-
sent clients in situations of great immediacy. A significant number of
injunction actions are settled with reductions in picketing despite a
seemingly restrictive statute and a highly organized workforce. This
study of legal culture examines the role of lawyers in striving to cre-
ate predictability, especially in regard to judges and the police, and in
transforming conflicts of value into disputes over interests that can
be resolved without resort to formal adjudication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Injunctions against labor picketing are a highly emotive and
important area of American labor history and union ideology.
Since the 1930s, federal and state laws have explicitly protected
strikes and picketing.' New York's anti-injunction statute (N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 807 (McKinney, 1977)) appears even more protective
than the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. § 101-115), and
the state has a long tradition of unionism and a highly organized
work force. Yet, when injunctions against picketing are sought in
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1 Restrictions on picketing, however, were explicitly imposed by the Taft-
Hartley Amendments (61 Stat. 136 (1947)), and courts read in restrictions on
the right to strike even prior to this statute (see generally Atleson, 1983).
Courts have not accorded labor speech such as picketing the same degree of
protection as political or even commercial speech (see Atleson, 1985b: 856-62;
Pope, 1984; Yale Law Journal, 1982).
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Buffalo, relief is obtained with considerable frequency. Attempts
to obtain injunctions generally result in privately negotiated settle-
ments and less frequently in formal judicial orders to which the
union has consented. These settlements or injunctions generally
restrict the scope or scale of picketing. Appeals from judicial or-
ders are rare, and thus there are few appellate decisions that clar-
ify the scope of the statute.
The question is why, given a seemingly unambiguous anti-in-
junction statute, injunction actions are both brought and settled.
To study the initiation and resolution of these disputes, I inter-
viewed and examined the files of union and labor attorneys in Buf-
falo. The result is an inquiry into legal culture, its effects on the
handling of disputes, and the way in which lawyers act to make be-
havior predictable. Attention is directed primarily to the process
by which disputes of value are settled and, secondarily, to the role
of formal law in that process.
The assumption that a strike and its accompanying pressure
(or the threat of a strike) make collective bargaining work under-
lies the explicit protection of concerted action in the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 (ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 499 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. 1974)). In a sense, as the
Supreme Court said in another context, collective action is part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process (National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) v. Insurance Agents International Union
361 U.S. 478 (1960)). The picket line is a pressure device used to
resolve an economic or contractual dispute. When the employer
seeks legal assistance, the legal basis for its plea for relief is not
the economic harm the picketing has caused, but rather the claim
that collective activity has exceeded the bounds of propriety, a
boundary defined by formal law. Although the employer in es-
sence asserts rights based upon property, it stresses community in-
terests because injunctions are permitted to deter violence and to
maintain public order. Yet the employer obviously also wishes to
use law to affect the balance of economic forces, that is, to make
the law a participant in the dispute.
2
Despite the strong economic interests of employers and the
traditional values of unions, injunction actions are often settled by
private agreement or by consent to a judicial order. One explana-
tion for settlement in this area might be that the statute, either in
language or as administered by courts, is not as clear as first ap-
pears. Indeed, state trial and appellate court decisions in New
York show a willingness to grant injunctions in highly questiona-
ble situations despite the seemingly restrictive anti-injunction stat-
2 The use of law in this situation seems not to be motivated by a desire to
strengthen fragile bonds or to renegotiate an ongoing relationship (Yngvesson,
1985). Nevertheless, litigation in industrial relations is not inconsistent with
the continuation of the relationship as revealed by the frequent use of labor
arbitration.
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ute. Whatever problems of ambiguity may lie in the statute or de-
cisions, however, unions often decline to assert federal as well as
state statutory rights to engage in concerted activity.3 The legality
of picketing is rarely litigated at all. Settlements are reached prior
to, and indeed instead of, a judicial hearing.
Unions and employers are "repeat players" (RP), legal actors
who possess the motivation and ability to use the legal system to
pursue their long-term interests. According to Galanter (1974:
110-113), legal actions between repeat players should not be com-
monplace. Because these parties "play with each other repeatedly,
the expectation of continued mutually beneficial interaction would
give rise to informal bilateral controls" (ibid., p. 110. See also Ma-
caulay, 1963: 64). When litigation is initiated, however, Galanter
(1974: 112) theorizes that one might expect "heavy expenditure on
rule-development, many appeals, and rapid and elaborate develop-
ment of the doctrinal law." Moreover, one would also expect
"practice to be closely articulated to the resulting rules" (ibid., p.
113). Yet, contrary to the Galanter model, the picketing-injunction
situation does not result in either prolonged litigation or clear rule
development.
This study of injunction cases suggests several explanations
for the unexpected pattern. First, although lawyers perceive the
statute to be clear, judicial behavior is not viewed as predictable
(Macaulay, 1966). 4 Second, the time and expense involved in litiga-
tion militate against zealous advocacy (See Macaulay, 1963; Aspin,
1970. See also Weiler, 1983). Finally, settlement is possible be-
cause a range of indeterminancy exists between the parties' inter-
ests despite the fact that initially none seems to exist. The legal
choice is actually broader than merely a judicial decision to grant
or refuse to grant an injunction, for judges traditionally have as-
sumed the power to grant partial injunctions, that is, to grant or-
ders that bar violence and that carefully specify the maximum
3 See, for instance, Capital Newspapers Division-The Hearst Corp. v.
Chester W. Vanderbilt, 44 Misc. 2d 542 (1964); Triangle Finishing Corp. v. Tex-
tile Workers Union of America, 145 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1955). One explanation for
the settlement of injunction actions, which may seem generous in light of ap-
plicable law, may be provided by Ross (1970). In his study involving the insur-
ance industry, Ross found that the generosity of insurance companies in set-
tling claims was based primarily upon intraorganizational dynamics. Faced
with conflicting orders to settle expeditiously but economically, insurance ad-
justers act in accordance with the order to close quickly, which can be more
easily measured. The actions of unions, however, do not seem to be affected
by conflicting orders, nor are they bombarded by injunction threats. As will
be subsequently noted, however, intra-institutional concerns are relevant to
the common settlement of injunction actions.
4 Unlike the situation involved in Macaulay's study, the primary uncer-
tainty present here involves broad judicial discretion more than ambiguous
substantive law. Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) suggest that vague legal
standards affect negotiations and relative bargaining power. They focus upon
strategic advantage and do not discuss the possibility that lawyers will try to
deal with uncertainty by creating their own standards.
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number or location of pickets per entrance. The focus of most in-




I studied attempts by employers in Buffalo to secure injunc-
tions against picketing between 1974 and 1979. Injunction cases
were identified through interviews with union and employer attor-
neys5 and by examining the special term calendars of the state
supreme court records in Buffalo (the trial court in New York's ju-
dicial system)6 as well as the labor union and strike files of two
Buffalo newspapers.? This search, aided by the recollections of at-
torneys, yielded twenty-four attempts in the five-year period.8
There was no accurate way to determine the number of situations
in which picketing occurred during the period.
Once cases were found, the primary sources of data were the
files and the memories of employer and union attorneys.9 Twelve
employer attorneys and nine union lawyers were interviewed. 10 A
number of attorneys had worked on more than one case, and op-
posing attorneys in all but two cases were interviewed. Interviews
varied widely in length, from one to three hours, depending upon
the lawyer's recollections, the number of cases the lawyer had
been involved in, and the normal interruptions of law practice.
Appellate court reports were also reviewed to provide information
on the incidence of appeals, the scope of judicial discretion permit-
ted, and the success of union appeals of injunctions.
5 These interviews produced 8 cases not identified from other sources.
6 A search of court calendars disclosed 9 cases. State supreme court files
were also searched, but the filing process proved too inefficient for systematic
research. Supreme court records in Buffalo are filed by defendant's name, and
labor or picketing cases are not filed separately. Commonly, an officer of the
defendant union, rather than the union itself, is listed as the first-named de-
fendant, making research abnormally time-consuming. None of the cases dis-
covered from the newspaper files was listed, but several new cases were dis-
covered. Many injunction petitions are not filed, however. Moreover, many
injunction actions that terminate in a privately negotiated settlement are not
formally filed at all. Indeed, in some cases petitions were sent to union law-
yers prior to filing with the court. Should a settlement occur at this point, at-
torneys need not file the papers or pay the ten dollar fee.
7 The papers were the Buffalo News and the now-defunct Buffalo Cou-
rier Express. This search yielded 7 cases.
8 There is no reason to believe that this period was atypical for labor-
management relations.
9 Attorneys were uniformly helpful and cooperative. Without their gen-
erous assistance this study could not have been conducted. The only condition
requested was one of confidentiality, an understandable and reasonable re-
quest that has been fully respected.
10 The number of labor law attorneys, especially union side, in any com-
munity is generally small. Union representation in Buffalo, for instance, is al-
most completely centered in 4 firms.
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B. The Interviews
Lawyers who had sought injunctions were asked to describe
the factors they used in determining whether to seek an injunc-
tion; the predictability of the substantive law and range of possible
outcomes, at least compared with other areas of practice; and how
their views of the law and possible outcomes affect the decision to
file an injunction petition or to negotiate a settlement as well as
the framing of the content of a settlement.
Union attorneys were asked to describe the decision to negoti-
ate or to insist on a hearing, and the extent to which substantive
legal ambiguity, broad judicial discretion, or other constraints af-
fect the decision to negotiate, the content of any settlement, or the
decision to appeal or to forgo an appeal. They were also asked
whether union clients perceive negotiation as a surrender of statu-
tory rights and, if so, why the statutory right to a hearing or to an
appeal is routinely waived. Finally, they were asked about the ex-
tent to which intra-union political or institutional considerations
affect the union's behavior.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LAW
The general contours of the law regulating the granting of in-
junctions can easily be described, although the details are quite
complex. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 generally barred fed-
eral courts from granting injunctions in "labor disputes," except
when picketing involved violence. Similar statutes were subse-
quently enacted in many states, and New York's version, section
807 of the state's labor law (N.Y. LAB. LAw § 807 (McKinney,
1977)), mirrors the federal statute."
1 The substantive right to strike and to picket was first given explicit
federal protection in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Certain types
of strikes and picketing, however, were subsequently barred by legislation in
1947 and 1959. This federal protection supersedes, or preempts, state regula-
tion in cases falling within the broad commerce clause jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act except for a narrow range of situations where the
state's interest is deemed to be critical, most commonly when violence has oc-
curred or is threatened. See Allan-Bradly Local No. IIII v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board (WERB), 315 U.S. 740 (1942); United Auto Workers
(UAW) v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949); UAW v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956);
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957). The degree of violence can-
not, perhaps, be clearly expressed, possibly because our definition is affected
by our underlying values. In Youngdahl, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court
permitted the state court to enjoin mass name calling and abusive language as
well as threats. The issue, said the Court, is "whether or not the conduct and
language of the strikers were likely to cause physical violence" (355 U.S. at 138
(1957) (emphasis added). It held that "words can readily be so coupled with
conduct as to provoke violence" (ibid.). Nevertheless, the injunction could
only be as broad as the conduct deemed wrongful.
Beyond enjoining any conduct or language that might be an "incitement
to violence," therefore, the state court could not restrict peaceful picketing. A
complete prohibition against picketing could only be sustained if a "pattern of
violence was established which would inevitably reappear in the event picket-
ing was later resumed" (ibid. at 139). The tests above contain critical empirical
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The explicit purpose of these statutes was to free union collec-
tive action from judicial restraints that were often perceived to be
arbitrary and based on no guidelines other than the social and eco-
nomic views of individual judges.12 Moreover, these statutes were
designed to remove the policy-making function of judges, for the
courts' standards involved a determination of the degree of "legiti-
mate" or "justifiable" interest the union may have had for its ac-
tions (Atleson, 1985a).
Prior to the passage of this legislation, judges espoused the
view that injunctions merely returned the situation to the status
quo. In reality, however, an injunction can effectively determine
the outcome of dispute. The timing of collective action is often
critical, and the energy involved in gearing up for such a move is
difficult to revive if collective action is initially barred.
The New York statute bars injunctions in labor disputes ex-
cept in seemingly narrow circumstances. 13 Like its federal prede-
cessor, the statute prohibits an injunction except after both hold-
ing a formal hearing14 and making detailed findings of fact
specified in the statute.
The statute also mandates certain procedures for the hearing
(N.Y. LAB. LAw § 807-1, 2 (McKinney, 1977)). The plaintiff-em-
ployer is required to plead and prove compliance with all legal ob-
ligations and to allege and prove that it made every reasonable ef-
fort to settle the dispute by negotiation, mediation or arbitration
(ibid., § 807-4). The plaintiff must also file a minimum under-
taking of one thousand dollars in case of expense or damage
and behavioral assumptions on which data do not exist, and the context and
pressure atmosphere of an injunction proceeding may not be conducive to
careful determination of these issues.
Both the reported cases and the union lawyers interviewed in this study
indicated that the injunction cases focus almost exclusively on section 807 of
the state law. Preemption issues are rarely if ever raised. Given that it is a
state judge who would determine whether violence was threatened or existed
sufficient to fall within the exception to preemption, the viability of this doc-
trine in state court is questionable in any event. As Sovern (1963: 548) has
noted, a state judge's decision "about the point at which picketing becomes vio-
lent or massed may obviously differ from the decision the NLRB would have
reached on the same facts."
12 The problems with unregulated judicial activism are noted in the clas-
sic book by Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction
(1930). This work was basically a brief for the passage of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act. See also Bernstein, 1960: 391-415; Gregory, 1961: 158-199.
13 New York judicial decisions under section 807 generally assert that
"Section 807 of the Labor Law, modeled after the Federal Norris-LaGuardia
Act, imposes stricter limitations than previously existed on the issuance of in-
junctions in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute" (Waldbaum,
Inc., v. United Farm Workers, AFL-CIO, 87 Misc. 2d 267, 269 (1976).
14 Injunction proceedings in New York begin with the filing of a motion
to show cause why an injunction should not issue. Lawyers stated that this
motion, filed with supporting affidavits usually alleging picket line or other vi-
olence, is always granted. A hearing may then be held to determine whether
an injunction should issue.
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caused by the improvident or improper issuance of an injunction
(ibid. § 807-3).
The statute limits the scope of relief that can be granted. Be-
cause courts can only enjoin violent activity, the legal inquiry is
whether, assuming violence is found, the violent behavior can be
separated from allowable picketing. In making this determination,
courts may permit the picketing but restrict the number and loca-
tion of picketers.
Most importantly, three critical findings are necessary before
an injunction may issue. The first is a finding that "unlawful acts
have or a breach of any contract not contrary to public policy has
been threatened or committed and that such acts or breach will be
executed or continued unless restrained" (ibid., § 807-1(a)). New
York courts have interpreted this requirement with considerable
flexibility. In Triangle Finishing Corp. v. Textile Workers Union
of America (145 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (1955)), Justice Alisi said that
"picketing to be peaceful must be free, not only of violence, but
also free of any intimidation, free of any form of physical obstruc-
tion or interference." This passage, frequently quoted by New
York courts, provides the justification for an injunction for any
judge who believes that picketing is inherently coercive.1 5
While courts exercise considerable latitude in deciding
whether collective action threatens violence, the second critical
finding required by the statute, that "substantial and irreparable
injury to complainant's property will follow unless the relief re-
quested is granted" (N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807-1(b) (McKinney, 1977)),
appears to allow less discretion. In fact, however, the courts fre-
quently focus not on the damage the violent or mass picketing was
or will be responsible for but on the economic damage the labor
dispute has caused as a whole. In Capital Newspapers Division-
The Hearst Corp. v. Chester W. Vanderbilt (44 Misc. 2d 542 (1964)),
for instance, the court found section 807-1(b) was satisfied because
the drastic decline in circulation which, to a great extent,
has been caused by the picketing activities adequately dem-
onstrates that substantial and irreparable injury to com-
plainant's property will follow unless the relief requested
is granted.
Such a focus renders the "substantial and irreparable injury" re-
quirement a minor hurdle if the union's activity is at all effective.
Finally, before granting equitable relief, a court must find that
15 Various state court decisions illustrate how easily "violent" or "mass"
picketing is found. See Busch Jewelry Co., Inc., v. United Retail Employees'
Union, Local 680, 281 N.Y. 150 (1939); B. C. Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Louis
Reiff, 14 Misc. 2d 37 (1958); Bridge Hardware Co., Inc., v. Hyman Horowitz, 22
Misc. 2d 914 (1949). Often the evidence relied on is extremely slight or, at
most, mildly provocative. Many states allow ex parte proceedings to form the
only basis for the injunction. See, generally, Aaron, 1964. The experience in
New York in the years after that state passed an anti-injunction statute is dis-
cussed in Galenson and Spector, 1942. See also Seidenberg, 1953.
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"the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's
property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection"
(N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807-1(e) (McKinney, 1977)). Yet after pointing
out that all the section 807 requirements tend to be found as a
matter of course, New York Jurisprudence dryly comments that
this is particularly true "with regard to the inability of public of-
ficers to protect the plaintiff's property." In Capital Newspapers
(at 546), for instance, the court admitted there was no evidence
presented as to the capability of the police department to furnish
adequate protection, but the court nevertheless held that section
807-1(e) was satisfied because
there exists doubt in the mind of the court whether any
municipal police force could effectively carry out its nor-
mal duties while at the same time constantly provide suffi-
cient protection to insure the maintenance of order and
protection to the public as well as the plaintiff in a heavily
picketed area. The court senses the legislative intent and
finds that the additional burden placed upon the police of-
ficers charged with the duty as set forth in the statute can-
not be met.
Thus, while a literal reading of each requirement of section
807 would make it extremely difficult to obtain any injunctive re-
lief, the decisions have often required merely a pro forma allega-
tion and finding, especially where "violent" union activity has been
alleged to exist. In many instances the section's requirements are
recited and, without explanation, deemed satisfied. In view of the
language employed, many parts of section 807 evidently invite
value judgments and conclusions that lie totally within the discre-
tion of the trial court.
Clearly, despite an apparently strong anti-injunction statute,
courts maintain considerable discretion in determining whether to
grant an injunction (see, e.g., Bridge Hardware Co., Inc. v. Hyman
Horowitz, 22 Misc. 2d 914 (1949)). Nevertheless, despite the ambi-
guities in the judges' views of violence, the employers' claims in
the cases studied involved allegations of unambiguously violent
acts by picketers. Union lawyers often stated that their adversa-
ries would not have filed for an injunction unless violence within
the statute existed, and they may have had sufficient information
to verify the allegations in employer affidavits. The conclusion, as
will be subsequently set out, is that claims and responses by both
sets of lawyers, at least in the lawyer community in Buffalo, are
affected by an interest in being viewed as responsible.
IV. THE MIDDLE GROUND
In the twenty-four cases studied in which employers sought
injunctions against union picketing, the parties consented to judi-
cial orders in nine cases, formal injunctions without consent were
granted in four cases, and private agreements (stipulations) were
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reached in two cases. 16 Thus, restrictions on picketing resulted in
the majority of cases (15 out of 24), and unions agreed to restric-
tions in eleven of those fifteen cases. In some "consent" cases,
however, the union consented based upon the perceived likelihood
that some kind of formal injunction would be otherwise forthcom-
ing.
The typical judicial order bars acts that would be violations of
the criminal law; prohibits interference with nonstrikers, custom-
ers, and other persons; and generally restricts the number and lo-
cation of picketers. An excerpt from a typical order follows:
ORDERED, that the defendants and their respective
agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons
whomsoever acting in their behalf or in conjunction with
them cease and desist:
1. From stationing more than ten (10) pickets at each
gate of the plaintiff's said plant;
2. From interfering or blocking any automobile,
truck, or pedestrian traffic on the roadway leading to the
plaintiff's said plant and from interfering or blocking any
sidewalk or driveway leading to said plant;
3. From forming a picket line in front of the plain-
tiff's said plant in which the pickets walk or stand closer
than five (5) feet from one another;
4. From trespassing or entering upon the premises or
place of business of plaintiff and from threatening, intimi-
dating, or turning aside against their will those who go or
would go to and from said place of business of the plaintiff;
5. From intimidating the employees of the plaintiff
herein, working for said plaintiff, and from otherwise
resorting to force, threats, or intimidation to compel said
employees to leave the employ of said plaintiff or to com-
pel said employees to refrain from working for said plain-
tiff;
6. From interfering or blocking directly or indirectly
any rail traffic into plaintiff's plant; ....
The parties often agree to limit picketing without a formal ju-
dicial order. Unlike formal orders, such private agreements or
"stipulations" do not subject the violator to the contempt power of
the court if they are breached. One attorney described a stipula-
tion as "basically a private contract between the parties." Should a
violation occur, however, the employer could decide to refile its in-
junction request. Lawyers stated that judges sometimes signed the
agreement, although they acknowledged that such action had no
legal significance, that is, the signing did not convert the private
agreement into a formal order. Stipulations look much like formal
orders, indicating the extent to which private settlement language
mirrors that of the courts.
Constraints on both employer and union attorneys help to ex-
plain why a settlement agreement often occurs without the need
16 Five cases were adjourned; the other 4 were discontinued or denied.
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for a court order and why orders are granted with the consent of
the parties without the statutory requirement of a hearing. Settle-
ment saves both time and expense, critical factors when judicial
action is often seen as unpredictable. Although the attorneys ex-
pressed concern about unpredictable judicial behavior, some union
attorneys said that they were inclined to settle because they be-
lieved their employer counterparts would not have sought injunc-
tion unless there was a reasonable basis for the employer's re-
quest. Thus, in most cases attorneys for both sides believed that
there was sufficient evidence of violence to waive the statutory bar
to injunctions.
Indeed, a substantial degree of coordination and cooperation
among attorneys is revealed in these cases. As repeat players in a
relatively small community, the possibilities for detecting over-
statement and irresponsibility may increase the extent to which la-
bor lawyers can rely on adversary representation. In addition, in
some cases an injunction settlement may be perceived to have in-
stitutional value for the union. Satisfied with its show of strength,
the union may not view a limit on the number of picketers as
either a waiver of principle or a serious economic restriction.
Moreover, the injunction may actually be useful to control rank-
and-file militants or to halt picketing that the union feels is unwise
but that it cannot politically be seen to oppose.
For both sets of attorneys, settlement is aided because a "mid-
die ground" exists between the attempt to bar all picketing and
the union's customary desire to avoid any judicial restriction. The
compromise position is often a settlement or judicial order that
limits the number or the location of picketers or both.1 7 The pri-
vately reached settlements mirror formal orders granted by courts.
These compromises represent real concessions by each party,
17 The following excerpt is an example of the great particularity to be
found in these orders:
F. Having any pickets or other person at or near plaintiff's ...
plant [is prohibited] except as follows:
1. During the hours of 7:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m. no more than three
pickets may patrol or be in the vicinity of the entrance of plaintiff's
plant at ... [address]; no more than two pickets may patrol or be in
the vicinity of the westerly ... entrance to plaintiff's facility, and no
more than two additional persons covered by this order may be pres-
ent in or about the vicinity of the strikers' van or other vehicle.
a. Union shall be allowed 10 minutes to change shifts at 7:00
a.m.; 12:00 noon; and 4:30 p.m. During this period, no more than an
additional five persons covered by this order may report to the strik-
ers' van. At 4:00 p.m., an additional two persons may report to the
strikers' van. The limitation on the total number of picketers shall
apply throughout the shift changes.
2. During all other hours, no more than three persons covered
by this order may be present in or about the vicinity of plaintiff's fa-
cility or the strikers' van or other vehicle; and no more than two
picketers may patrol.
3. Each picket shall be separated from every other picket by a
distance of at least six feet at all times.
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within a legal system that literally protects peaceful picketing and
restricts the injunctive power of courts.
The norms of dispute resolution are thus not the product of
formal adjudication. Although judges are indeed involved, as
either motivators of settlement or somewhat unpredictable adjudi-
cators, the process of dispute resolution emerges primarily as a
creation of the parties and their attorneys.
V. THE CONTEXT FOR SETTLEMENT
This study primarily focuses upon the assumptions and behav-
ior of lawyers. The behavior of lawyers, however, cannot be to-
tally understood without analyzing how they perceive the role of
other actors who can affect the outcome of injunction proceedings.
For instance, the police enforce orders and injunctions, and their
testimony is critical should any case reach a hearing. In addition,
the trial court judge plays a crucial role both as mediator and as
formal adjudicator. Interviews with lawyers reveal a range of am-
bivalence about the judges, their objectivity, their knowledge, and
their public posture. Finally, lawyers may be influenced by the po-
tential role of the appellate courts. The following discussion is
based primarily upon the perceptions of the lawyers who were in-
terviewed and does not include the perceptions of others, such as
the clients.
A. Public Order and the Role of the Police
To avoid the statutory proscriptions on the granting of injunc-
tions, courts must conclude that police are unable to keep order
(e.g., to restrict criminal and civil wrongs or to protect "ingress
and egress"). The New York statute requires that the court find
that the "public officers charged with the duty to protect com-
plainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate
protection" (N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807-1(e) (McKinney 1977)).
Petitions for injunctions, then, must make allegations similar
to the following:
TENTH: Plaintiff has consistently applied to police offi-
cials by numerous telephone calls from the... [date] to the
present date and by daily personal visits, for protection
against the unlawful acts of the union and the other de-
fendants, but such protection against the activities set out
herein has been inadequate in as much as such public offi-
cials are unable to furnish in full the protection necessary
to plaintiff against the commission of such unlawful acts.
The court's determination that the police are unable to maintain
order is almost wholly based upon the testimony of police officers.
Such testimony is only received if a statutory hearing is held,
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although attorneys may seek the views of the police before reach-
ing a settlement.1 8
The role of the police also leads to the questioning of the ra-
tional decision model. The settlement--or injunction--often
serves to empower the police. If a hearing does occur, the statute
necessitates police testimony that they are unable to secure order.
If the police view such an admission as a failure in law enforce-
ment, they might understandably be reluctant to provide testi-
mony to support an injunction. In fact, however, attorneys re-
ported that the police were willing to offer support for injunctive
relief, characterizing the problem not as a failure of law enforce-
ment but rather as a product of manpower constraints. As one
company lawyer explained,
The company called the police, who did a good job when
there; but the police were not there all the time. The local
police captain asked the company to seek an injunction af-
ter a while, before he'd send his men in.... In the hear-
ing ... [the union attorney] pressed the police inadequacy
requirement of section 807, over ... [the company's] argu-
ment that the police were unable to maintain order. The
judge asked for police testimony. The deputy commis-
sioner who was monitoring the strike said that after two
days of large-scale picketing, his manpower was too thin in
the rest of the precinct. By his testimony, the police repre-
sentative in effect asked the parties to limit the number of
pickets.
An injunction provides the police with important legal support
in a sensitive situation. Police are convinced that injunctions em-
power them to enforce the law, even though they technically only
bar violations of existing law. The injunctions legitimize enforce-
ment efforts by police who might otherwise be disinclined to en-
force existing law on picketers.
Except for limitations on the scope and location of picketing,
the primary content of a judicial order is the proscription of al-
ready unlawful action. Private stipulations will bar similar behav-
ior. Although they are only private agreements, stipulations are
obviously created in the "shadow of the law" (or the shadow of a
judge).
A company lawyer stated that he sought a "judge-signed pa-
per" to give to the union, the company, and the police. The preva-
lent police feeling, he explained, was to refrain from moving with-
out a court order: "In a strike situation, you don't enforce the law
without an injunction." 19 Indeed, at the few judicial hearings that
18 It is not clear how often union attorneys seek the views of the police
prior to reaching a settlement.
19 The lawyer had not learned this from the police but rather from his
clients, who deal with the police in these cases. With the possible exception of
the Buffalo Police Department, an injunction generally helps motivate police
to act.
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were held, police officials were said to state routinely that they
would not try to provide a pathway into a plant without an injunc-
tion. The judicial empowerment, apparently, does matter.
For instance, in one of the more explosive cases involving a
bus company strike, the company alleged a good deal of violence
and even the union attorney conceded in his interview that an in-
junction could probably be obtained. The company alleged de-
struction of property by picketers, including the use of "Polish
cannons" (gas bombs made of beer cans filled with golf balls), and
possession of baseball bats. The company also sought a ban on
what its attorney referred to as libelous and slanderous press
statements. The attorney alleged that the union had been stopping
occupied buses, removing the management drivers, and leaving the
passengers to sit without anyone to drive the buses:
There was use of home-made cannons, sabotage to vehicles,
removal of fan belts, creating a dangerous situation in
which the riding public could have been killed. Most of
these incidents were off the picket line, but there were in-
cidents on the line too: picketers got riotous, blocked pas-
sage, threatened management drivers of vehicles.
The company lawyer was certain he could have obtained an in-
junction had a full trial been held, and he believed he had wit-
nesses for every allegation. "Police reports showed the futility of
law enforcement efforts. They showed up often but never made
any arrests." The inference could then be drawn that police were
unable to control the scene. Yet the police chief told him that the
"police don't want to favor one side over the other, and don't want
to appear anti-union." Thus, they were "reluctant to go in without
an injunction."
Sometimes police reluctance existed even after a judicial order
was issued, as one company attorney noted:
The police like to have an injunction. But this is the only
case I've ever had where the . . . county sheriffs did not
ever try to keep the plant open, even after the injunction
was issued: We had to call the judge and get him after the
sheriff's department.
Thus the injunction provides evidence that the police are acting
neutrally. In addition, an injunction has a significant effect on
those to whom it applies. A company lawyer stated:
What is the purpose of enjoining already illegal conduct?
It is to give the police additional "meat" when making ar-
rests. Contempt is a real threat: Clarity of details gives
the police more feeling of authority to back up their ac-
tions. The most important reason ... is to have a subcon-
scious effect on troublemakers, that they'll be held in con-
tempt for these specific acts as well as for any "illegal
acts."
This may be why judges occasionally signed stipulations that were
clearly not formal orders.
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Injunctions, then, have a power beyond the mere assertion by
the police that certain actions are unlawful, and police armed with
an injunction may face less hostility and opposition from picketers.
As attorneys noted, injunctions "cool down" tense situations, and
they do so "immediately." Such a perception may explain why
judges sometimes sign stipulations, an act whose effect is only
"psychological." According to a union attorney,
The stipulated order was not an injunction. The company
could not have sued upon it nor gotten a contempt ruling.
It was merely an agreement. The judge's signature is
mainly psychological.
The power of injunctions is perhaps implicitly recognized by
the injunctions and agreements themselves, which, after all, enjoin
actions that are already unlawful. It is also possible that the in-
junction is perceived as narrowing the range of discretion that the
police possess to enforce formal law. Moreover, injunctions also
serve a function for union officials. One company attorney ex-
plained that
enjoining conduct already illegal-this should not be neces-
sary, but it is. As a practical and political matter, most
union leaders won't control membership without being
able to tell the pickets that it's per order of the court. It is
politically better for the union officer to "blame" restric-
tions on the court.
Despite police reluctance to act decisively without an order,
some union attorneys perceived the police with suspicion while
others felt that police testimony was generally fair. Some union
attorneys-as well as the company lawyer quoted below-men-
tioned that police are also unionized or come from working class
families.
The police inadequacy requirement of section 807 was typi-
cally dealt with in... [this case]. [The judge) . . . required
police testimony. The police are in a bad position. They
know the workers they have to deal with. The police don't
want to hurt other unions-after all, the police and labor
are both union-oriented. So the police will sit pat while in-
cidents happen, but on the stand will testify that they can
handle it, but not much longer, or manpower will be
drained if they have to keep handling it. In... [this case]
the police said that in order to control the scenes, they'd
need more police cars and chiefs. This was not possible-it
would drain normal operations.
Another company lawyer presented a similar view. He noted
that the local police were often reluctant to get involved and that
they usually preferred to have an injunction in hand before acting.
He mused that the police often have unionist feelings and that
they will not intervene against another union without being forced
to do so by court order. This lawyer recalled one incident in which
the police were standing outside the plant gate. One of the pickets
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started to throw rocks at the police. A policeman took a rock and
threw it back inside the gate, saying something to the effect that
"'if you want to throw rocks, throw it at them, but not at us!'"
The "realism" of the police is indicated in the following news-
paper report (Buffalo News, October 26, 1983: 17) quoting the Buf-
falo chief of police in regard to name-calling on picket lines:
Deputy Police Commissioner John B. Myers told the
Buffalo News that the police receive a report almost every
day about reported picket line violence. However, he said,
the amount of violence is below that of most industrial
strikes.
He said that the police are not concerned with name-
calling. "If someone comes through a picket line, I doubt
very much that the pickets are going to say 'good morn-
ing,'" he said.
Commissioner Myers said the police force is impartial
in the strike. "We're going to stay that way," he said.
B. The Judges
The judges are key actors in injunction actions. As in most ac-
tions brought to the court, judges in injunction cases encourage
settlement. Attorneys in these cases, however, reported that many
judges were particularly disinclined to take formal action. This re-
luctance to act may be fueled by the sensitivity of the judges to
their position as elected officials in an active union city, but the
judges also may recognize the incentives for parties with a continu-
ing relationship to resolve their own differences. Many of the at-
torneys described the substantial efforts of the judges to facilitate
settlement or at least to avoid issuing a formal decision. A union
attorney noted that while in court "No testimony was taken. The
two sides spent six hours in chambers, working out a settlement,
with Judge . . . sitting back passively. The judge was not in the
room most of the time, in fact." The company attorney in the
same case explained that ". . . the judge's role was to sit in initially
and then suggest that the parties work it out."
Most attorneys know the local state court judges even though
the bulk of their litigation is conducted before federal judges, the
NLRB, or private labor arbitrators. In general, lawyers reported
that they have little control over the particular state court judge
they face. Actions are initiated by a show-cause order. Lawyers
did have some control over the particular judge who responded to
the show-cause request, but all attorneys stated that these requests
are never denied.20 As a company attorney explained, lawyers
20 Nevertheless, company attorneys take no chances, as one of their num-
bers explained: "Judge ... is a friend of the law firm, so he was sought out for
the show-cause order. However, once the show-cause order is signed, there is
no further opportunity to shop for a trial judge."
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have no control over the choice of the judge to whom the action is
subsequently directed:
Company attorneys do not judge-shop. It's too hard to do.
The special term judge assigns it. The only variable is:
Who is currently sitting in special term for the month?
Show-cause orders are never denied-they merely get you
on the calendar.
Nonetheless, lawyers can try to time their action to attempt to
be assigned to a particular judge. Thus a company attorney noted,
that [one] judge is to be avoided when seeking a labor in-
junction, because of [his] . . . labor background. It is not
always possible to time the bringing of the case to a judge's
tenure in special term.
As this attorney observed, company counsel usually does not have
the luxury of controlling the timing or the action. Even so, local
judges, even one with a union background, were generally per-
ceived as fair. Other judges were primarily seen as strong advo-
cates of peace and order. Note that these judges are elected, a fact
that may lie behind these comments by a company attorney:
Judges are reluctant to enjoin in any event, because they
don't want to be seen as anti-labor. . . . Generally, the
judge sits back and gives no initial pressure. They don't
like to enjoin, unless forced to do so.
One of the biggest problems.., in the Buffalo area is try-
ing to find a judge willing to make a decision.
First, every judge that I have ever appeared before tries to
get the parties in the proper case to enter into some kind
of consent order. Judges do not want to deny companies
the right to do business in an ailing economy in Western
New York and ... judges in Erie County do not want to
adversely affect the rights of the labor organization. The
judges in this county are more and more Democrat and
tied to labor and are very sensitive, in my judgment, to the
rights of the working man to collectively bargain his lot in
life. There is no question in my mind but that they would
rather not decide cases as much as have the lawyers come
to a consensus on it.
Yet not all lawyers viewed judges as being open minded. A
union attorney stated, for instance, that "courts here are quick to
grant injunctions .... Judges feel it hurts the union less to grant
than the company to refuse."
A minority of attorneys, with some reluctance, conceded that
they were concerned about the judges' range of discretion:
Trial outcome in state court is not predictable. Labor law-
yers don't like state [supreme court] judges-they don't
have enough cases to understand the law.... The attitude
toward unions by the judiciary varies from judge to judge.
[Judge] ... is tough on unions; [Judge] ... is OK. [union
attorney]
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In our district we go to a special-term judge; whoever hap-
pens to be there when the conduct you want to stop starts,
you have to go to him with your application. It won't af-
fect my strategy in the sense of judge-shopping. It may af-
fect my thinking as the chances of being successful in ob-
taining the best order for my client. . . Some judges
require strict compliance of the [statutorily required plead-
ing and proof] conditions, others don't understand it or
don't care. We recently had one dismissed where there
was a failure of the compliance of the conditions. [com-
pany attorney]
The union views the legal outcome as unpredictable. This
case bears them out. But trial courts are perceived neither
as anti- or pro-union. There is no general trend. It de-
pends more on who the judge is. [The judge in this case]
... ruled against the union, but is not anti-union. He's just
anti-make-a-decision. [union attorney]
One company attorney stated that he preferred the "letter-of-the-
law" judges rather than those who make decisions by the "seat of
their pants" because the former are more predictable, thus al-
lowing a lawyer to give sound advice to a client.
Because of these views, company attorneys representing cli-
ents who are currently being picketed are more willing to reach a
private settlement. For them, not only may judges urge private
resolution, but time is of the essence. In one case this pressure
merged with the company attorney's acknowledgment that he
sought an agreement because he felt the case was not sufficiently
strong to obtain an injunction. "Initial incidents were fairly minor
in and of themselves," he said. "But there was pressure from the
corporate higher-ups to enjoin." The attorney went to court seek-
ing only a settlement or stipulation, "hoping that a deal could be
worked out." Despite the likelihood that no order could have been
obtained, the result was a negotiated settlement.21
A second characteristic, and surely related, is the tremendous
influence judges can exert on the outcome by either urging attor-
neys to settle or actually taking part in the settlement discussions
(see Botein, 1963: 226-252; Galanter, 1985). The following excerpt
from a local newspaper (Buffalo Evening News, October 12, 1976:
33) mirrors the comments of attorneys:
... [The judge conducted the] show-cause hearing, after
which he refused to bar picketing, but directed the attor-
neys to draw an order limiting the number of pickets to 1.
21 The first stipulation broke down and the employer against requested
an order. The court, however, refused and encouraged a second stipulation,
which was later followed by a third. The second stipulation was also agreed
upon, even though the judge, who had not presided over the first stipulation,
stated that the incidents were minor. The third stipulation resulted in a limi-
tation on the number of picketers. Although there had been 50 picketers at
each gate, the parties agreed to limit the number to 12. According to the com-
pany attorney, this figure came from the testimony of a police officer as to
"how many pickets could be controlled."
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Though the judge refused to enjoin, he issued a stern ver-
bal warning against interference with access to the plant:
"The last thing I want to do is issue an injunction, but I
will if I have to. The court cannot tolerate such interfer-
ence. If some hothead wants to challenge the law, he will
find he has a tiger by the tail."
Although many judges were perceived as unwilling to make a
decision, many were thought to be perfectly willing to enjoin un-
lawful actions and at least to limit the scope of picketing. The de-
termination of what behavior violates the criminal law is made by
the judge; there need be, of course, no formal criminal proceeding.
Moreover, the insistence of judges on settlements puts pressure on
a union and its counsel to discount the union's rights. In one case,
for instance, the company returned to court seeking a new order
after a private stipulation had broken down. The company alleged
that the union had violated the stipulation daily by blockading and
assaulting exiting vehicles. A private company guard was report-
edly attacked, and the police had taken forty-five minutes to arrive
after the incident. Nevertheless, a company attorney reported,
The judge recommended a second stipulation, rather than
a hearing. The parties agreed to try it again. The judge set
up a conference with all parties and lectured the company
and union representatives to respect the stipulations. He
seemed reluctant to issue an injunction-the incidents
were minor, no real personal injury, property damage was
minor. The stipulation had merely broken down. Thus a
second stipulation was urged, reflecting the judge's reluc-
tance to formally act.
Importantly, the union consented to the judge's recommendation
even though it believed there was no basis for an injunction. Thus,
although attorneys did acknowledge the unpredictability of judicial
decisions, they simultaneously affirmed the general predictability
of judicial behavior. Whether via benign neglect or affirmative in-
tervention, courts avoid imposing formal decisions and encourage
either private settlement or agreement on the scope of a judicial
order.
C. The Appellate Courts
The parties to such cases, although repeat players in Ga-
lanter's terms (1974: 97-104), generally do not appeal or seek
"clear rules." The basic reason, as these union attorneys explain,
is that appeals take too much time and money:
Appeals are never contemplated. It has never come up.
There is no time to think about it-the cases arise too
quickly. It would be nice to be able to have papers which
are better written and which might take into account pos-
sible appellate results, but it just never happens. There is
not time.
The appellate outcome is not looked to-it's too remote in
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time.... It certainly was not considered here, nor [have I]
* " . ever done it elsewhere.
Even company attorneys realize the impracticality of appeals:
Appellate action was never in mind. The case was too
close to settlement of the contract. Appeals are costly and
time-consuming. Small unions can't afford it.
A union is thus different from many other types of repeat
players in that it is both a democratic organization and one often
possessing limited funds. This situation frequently forces a union
to eschew principle for pragmatism. Repeat players may have sig-
nificant differences in political and economic power that in turn
affect both their relationship and their relationship with their cli-
ents.22 Pressures of time and money, then, tend both to encourage
settlements and to discourage appeals.
Appeals, moreover, take time and, while a decision may aid in
future disputes, vindication in the current conflict may come too
late to be perceived as worthwhile. Timely group action is crucial,
especially given the institutional problems of attempting to reinsti-
tute and reinvigorate group action that has been delayed. Thus,
although the parties may abstractly value the existence of clear
precedents or rules, the situation may militate against the effort to
obtain them.23 Finally, the value of legal precedent may be limited
to the unique factual situation of a particular case. As a result, ne-
gotiation is apparently perceived as a rational response. Since a
judge may totally or partially prohibit picketing, unions pursue a
"mini-max" strategy, agreeing to a limitation on the number or lo-
cation of picketers as a sensible alternative to the risk of maxi-
mum restriction of picketing.
The lack of appellate involvement has at least two effects.
First, while the actual decisions of appellate courts may seem rela-
tively unimportant, their absence affects litigant behavior. Lack-
ing appellate decisions that instruct the trial judges, attorneys
22 Although, as Galanter (1974) notes, the repeat players/one-shotters
categories do not exactly parallel the "haves/have nots" line, there is some
overlap.
23 In the over 4 decades following the passage of section 807 of the New
York labor law, only the Mays, Busch, and Ballis cases involving the en-
joinability of picketing on a finding of violence under the statute have reached
the New York State Court of Appeals, the state's highest court. Once injunc-
tive relief is granted by the trial court, appellate review is limited to whether
the trial court findings are sustained by the evidence. See May's Furs and
Ready-to-Wear, Inc., v. Aaron Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331 (1940); and Busch Jewelry
Co. The court of appeals has shown reluctance to set aside the equitable relief
granted. In Busch Jewelry Co. (at 157), for instance, the court indicated that
"where such an injunction has been granted (a section 807 injunction), this
court may not interfere except for manifest abuse."
Generally, in appellate courts, as in federal courts, reversals only occur
when the appellate court determines that the injunctive relief granted was
clearly overbroad in scope, which usually means that the trial court enjoined
all picketing without a finding that peaceful picketing was impossible. See,
e.g., May's Furs; and Abou S. Ballis v. George Fuchs, 283 N.Y. 133 (1940).
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must deal with what they feel are unpredictable trial judges.
Moreover, although the possibility of appeal may be hypothetical
because settlement in some form is generally reached, the doubtful
value of an appeal may itself encourage settlement. Thus, most
union attorneys agreed with the following assessment by one of
their colleagues:
Appellate case law was not considered when preparing this
case. The chances of appeal are too remote. Certainly case
law is reviewed in general research, but the effect will
never be tested because we never get to appeal.
Second, the lack of appellate decisions affects the law that is
perceived to exist. Both union and company attorneys believe the
statute is clear (even though they also often see judicial resolution
as unpredictable), although they may disagree on the actual
"clear" meaning. The attorneys claimed, for instance, that they
knew the meaning of "violence" within the statute even though
there are few clear guidelines, decisions reveal very divergent judi-
cial perceptions, and limited research and preparation time tends
to give attorneys little opportunity to evaluate the situation. This
attitude is represented by the following statement by a company
attorney:
As for predictability of trial results, there may be variance
between judges, but no judge condones violence. Milling
around for fifteen minutes is not enjoinable conduct in the
local courts. The predictable aspect is that if there is seri-
ous violence, there will be an injunction issued. And these
injunctions work-the scene cools down immediately.
Accommodations are made and trade-offs certainly occur, but
the law is not used to clarify future interaction. Clear rules, how-
ever, may be thought to be less beneficial than a quick and rela-
tively inexpensive settlement or even an injunction that the par-
ties feel will not threaten basic principles. Moreover, if unions feel
that violence exists, clear rules may actually provide unwelcome
precedents. For employers, clear rules may not be needed because
the process works to provide results that are reasonably satisfac-
tory. The lawyers use the law to encourage more harmonious rela-
tions. An injunction or settlement "cools down" the scene even
though the basic dispute continues. Moreover, the resolution of
the picketing dispute may even aid in resolving the underlying eco-
nomic dispute.
D. The Lawyers
The settlement of injunction actions is similar to collective
bargaining: Intersecting interests, but not mutual interests, lead to
settlement. The interests of the lawyers, or what I have referred
to as the "lawyer community," intersect in a number of ways.
Lawyers have developed a sense, although not really a defini-
tion, of violence within the statute, and they have developed mech-
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anisms to process injunction cases. Union lawyers reported that
they "knew" when such violence occurred, even though both case
law and their experience with these cases were limited. A review
of the small number of reported decisions would lead one to con-
clude that the statutory definition of violence was potentially am-
biguous. In fact, however, the lawyers behave, or say they do, as if
the law were indeed clear.
The "clarity" seemed to be based upon implicit standards cre-
ated by, and seemingly shared by, attorneys on both sides. Union
lawyers, for instance, said they often relied upon the good faith
and professionalism of company attorneys in seeking injunctions in
the first place. Thus, in theory attorneys did not need to seek
clear rules, at least on this issue, for they had created them, albeit
implicitly.24 To avoid the perceived unpredictability of judicial be-
havior, the lawyers created standards and developed a process for
settling these disputes. Judges were at most wild cards that were
best avoided.
The norms of the legal community define certain acceptable
modes of behavior. Thus, union lawyers are not expected to stand
on their clients' rights and assert the full protection of the statute.
One young attorney representing a union refused to reach a pri-
vate settlement, opting instead for the statutory hearing. He was
informed by the company's attorney that, given his youth, he obvi-
ously "did not understand the process." Similarly, a company law-
yer criticized an out-of-town employer's attorney who sought "too
much." Young attorneys need to be socialized into community
norms, and out-of-town attorneys can be expected to be ignorant of
local norms.
Moreover, local company attorneys are expected to act reason-
ably and not seek unjustifiable injunctions. As could be expected,
company lawyers stressed their good faith in bringing injunction
actions. One company lawyer, for instance, believed he could have
obtained a total injunction in one case but only sought a numerical
limitation of the number of pickets:
We will only go into court when absolutely necessary. We
don't go in to harass a union or impress our client. We
won't make a mountain out of a molehill ... [because] this
hurts labor relations. By going into court only when neces-
sary, we preserve the effect of court action.
Bad violence is what we wait for; serious violations of
the criminal code. We won't go in for libel and slander,
even if the company wants it. Nor will we go in on disor-
derly conduct. Dirty names aren't enough. The union
thinks less of the employer who runs right to court for lit-
24 Yet in most of the cases for which employer pleadings and. affidavits
were obtained, acts were alleged that, if they had actually occurred, would be
characterized by most people as "violence." Thus whatever the lawyers actual
definition of violence, it was not an operative factor in these cases.
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tle things. Minor incidents are part of the strike and the
courts will not be moved by their occurrence.
Such activities, however, as blocking passage, damag-
ing vehicles, creating obstructions or dangerous situations
where people may get injured, are serious enough to seek
to enjoin. Also, if there is a critical need to get supervisory
staff through a gate to keep the plant operating, we will
seek to enjoin conduct which prevents passage.
I will never seek total ban on picketing, because peo-
ple have a right to picket and to seek a zero limit would be
contrary to what I feel is right.
Another employer counsel emphasized the care exercised in
creating the proof needed to seek restrictions on picketing:
The company hired a private security firm which was
briefed by the lawyers on what to look for: blockading,
massed picketing, and damage to persons and property.
The guards were told to keep a detailed log on the number
of pickets, their activities, and any incidents. For identifi-
cation of perpetrators, cameras were given to the guards.
The guards were further instructed to call the police if
trouble occurred, and to record what the police did.
This lawyer stressed the serious costs of the failure of an attempt
to obtain some kind of limitation: "To litigate in a case like this,
the company must have a very strong case, because if it loses, the
violence is seen as being condoned."
Union lawyers often expressed their confidence in the good
faith of company lawyers, a perception that may affect and be
shared by the judges and help to nurture the legal culture:
Trial outcome is not unpredictable if you have the facts.
Because we don't go to court often, most local judges pre-
sume that if you're there you have something.
Yet company action was sometimes motivated by client pres-
sure, as one company lawyer explained:
Initial incidents were fairly minor in and of themselves.
But there was pressure from the corporate higher-ups to
enjoin. Other [company] plants nation-wide had obtained
injunctions, and national management pressured the Buf-
falo plant to get an injunction too.
Prior to going into court the first time, [the company
attorney] ... spoke with the union attorney to get his view.
I went to court hoping a deal could be worked out, and saw
that it could. The company wanted an order; the union
wanted a stipulation. They compromised with a signed
stipulation, with a possible injunction if it was violated.
I did not feel I could have obtained an injunction at
this first court appearance. Police response to date had
been adequate, and therefore trial would have failed. So I
went looking for a stipulation [emphasis added].
Although this statement suggests that union attorneys should not
be so confident about the validity of employer claims, the case may
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be an anomaly as the firm was one of the few national companies
involved in this study.
Another company attorney stated that in one case he "asked
for the world" and received more than he expected. As in some
other cases, the employer requested damages, in this instance com-
pensatory and punitive. In addition, the use of "canned" or previ-
ously used bills of particulars by some company counsel raises
some question about the confidence often expressed by union at-
torneys in the good faith of their adversaries.
Nevertheless, the small number of lawyers and the absence of
known "union busters" obviously help create a fairly cooperative
atmosphere in the legal community of Buffalo, which may be un-
common in the United States as a whole and probably does not ex-
ist in larger cities with a bigger labor bar. As one union lawyer
said,
[The local management lawyers] . . . have never . .. con-
sciously misrepresented anything to me. Western New
York is rare: The labor lawyers know each other, have
mutual respect, and are very practical, looking always for
practical solutions. The personal respect between attor-
neys in a small labor law community helps to achieve prac-
tical results and is one reason for so few actual trials.
VI. THE CALCULUS OF SETTLEMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF DISPUTES
A. Settlement Incentives
This study describes a legal community that has developed
well-defined norms of behavior. In addition, institutional and com-
munity needs affect the advice that both company and union law-
yers give their clients.
Labor and company lawyers have common or at least inter-
secting interests. One convergent interest is the avoidance of judi-
cial discretion. Judges, often seen as unpredictable interpreters
and implementers of formal law, are to some extent outsiders, at
least to the zone created by the intersecting interests of company
and union lawyers. The legal community has sought an accommo-
dation that attempts to lessen the possible unpredictability of judi-
cial action by settling proceedings, as several union lawyers ex-
pressed:
It was to union's advantage to consent, because a trial
might be lost and bring more restrictions ....
The only thing we gave up was the number of pickets.
Might as well consent rather than try it and get the same
thing. A trial would therefore not be worth it.
The company filed a long bill of particulars. A trial was
not worth it. The client didn't want a trial just to drama-
tize. There was no advantage in not settling. We could
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earn more fees litigating, but the end result would be an
injunction. So we forewent a hearing and settled for a con-
sent order [actually, a stipulation]. Had the case been
tried, the union would have been enjoined.
This case was settled because of the likelihood that the
court would issue a temporary injunction. The alternative
was to settle it in what may be more advantageous terms
than what the court would do.
It is possible to see the police (and perhaps even the clients) as
"outsiders" as well, whose interests must be accommodated and
controlled so as not to upset the overlapping concerns of the law-
yer community.25
Many of the judges involved in the cases studied tried mightily
not to act at all, whereas others participated actively by encourag-
ing settlements. Both types of behavior, however, tended to lead
to negotiated settlements. It is difficult for lawyers to resist judi-
cial encouragement to settle, and attorneys understandably are re-
luctant to stand on procedural or substantive rights in the face of
judicial pressure. In this sense, judicial behavior was fairly pre-
dictable. Indeed, the settlement-prone behavior of lawyers makes
it less likely that judges will have to apply the statute.
Similarly, because both sides are interested in avoiding some
of the risks of rank-and-file militancy, judicial restrictions on pick-
eting may also serve some institutional interest.26 Some union
lawyers said (and some employer attorneys concurred) that their
clients saw injunctions as a way of containing militants and "hot
heads" who, union officers feared, could not be controlled in the
absence of a court order or at least an agreement:
To say a union welcomes an injunction is inaccurate.... A
stipulation in lieu of trial is helpful because additional
costs are avoided. It helps a union gain control of its own
members via a constant number of pickets.... But it's not
really "welcome"; it avoids higher costs.
A limitation would ease the burden of the leadership.
Younger workers were drinking on the picket line. A limi-
tation was desired by the union to enable it to control
these members.
And unions do welcome an injunction in cases such as this
25 This notion was suggested, with characteristic acuity, by my colleague
David Engel.
26 Picketing itself may serve institutional interests, as one company attor-
ney suggested:
There were prior strikes at [the company] ... but none so hot as this
one. The union did not attempt to negotiate. All knew mass picket-
ing was illegal and would be enjoined; but the union was desperate,
and angry about the replacements. "Let the court do it," they said.
The union was demonstrating its will to resist. The court gave the
company no greater relief than would a settlement, so there was
nothing to lose; picketing would be limited in any event.
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to control feisty membership. Such was the case here. The
violence was hurting chances of settling the strike.
Initially, it may not be clear how a private stipulation or set-
tlement, basically a contract, could serve this control function.27
Apparently to increase this control function, agreements were
sometimes signed by the judge, making it possible to publicize the
agreement as an injunction. Lawyers conceded that the judicial
signature was only "symbolic," but symbols have real effects, and
the parties' behavior seems to reflect the accurate perception that
injunctions are powerful vehicles for compliance.
Unions often had an additional, very practical reason for set-
tling and avoiding a hearing. First, if picketing occurred in winter,
securing picketers was often a problem in a city whose climate is
not always temperate. If, for instance, only three persons could be
expected to show up to picket in any event, there was little reason
to struggle to pressure for the abstract right for more than three
to picket, especially if some limitation was likely to be approved by
the judge. A number of union attorneys acknowledged this fact:
[The] ... company must show it [a limitation] to be neces-
sary. But union never had enough pickets anyway, so a
limit didn't hurt.
I consented to the order and numerical limitation out of
practical considerations. The other unions wanted it. And
mass picketing aside, it would have been hard to get ten
pickets on the line at this point. Had we gone to a full
hearing, the company probably could have obtained an in-
junction.
The union was interested in limiting the number of pickets
in this case for two reasons: First, the blizzard weather
made large-scale picketing difficult to maintain. A limita-
tion would ease the burden of the leadership. Second,
younger workers were drinking on the picket line. A limi-
tation was desired by the union, to enable it to control
these members.
Employers who believed that the conditions of the statute en-
titled them to an injunction were willing to settle for less because
of both the uncertainty of a judicial determination and the costs of
delay. The statute requires a full hearing and the taking of evi-
dence on each statutory condition. This takes time, which means
that the union activity will go unchecked for a longer period (as-
suming the injunction will ultimately be granted) and that greater
legal expenses will be incurred. As one company attorney noted,
Despite how fast I might be in getting my paperwork out,
it is still going to take a day to get it out. Despite how ag-
gressive I might be in trying to get a judge to sign an order
to show cause, it is going to be a day plus to get that
27 The agreement could be said to reflect the "least bad" result, with an
injunction to follow if violations occurred.
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done.... [T]he union is by virtue of the rigors of [section]
807 entitled to close my client's plant for a period of at
least two days.
Thus, the existence of the statute itself provides constraints for
employers, encouraging a move to some middle ground.
Unions too, particularly small local unions or ones with lim-
ited funds, are troubled by the further litigation expenses required
for a hearing, as their lawyers revealed:
This union is financially troubled and could not afford a
protracted hearing ....
The union did not seek a full hearing because it had no
money to pay a lawyer's trial fees. This influenced it to
seek the stipulation.
In one situation the union attorney was ready to try the case,
believing the company would only call one or two witnesses, "but
then the other side hired an of-counsel attorney, who promptly
subpoenaed twenty to thirty witnesses and union members to tes-
tify." Because of this, the attorney "went in looking to negotiate."
The costs imposed by bad publicity also encouraged settle-
ment:
We would have looked bad-there were some incidents
provable. Even if we'd won in a trial, some of our mem-
bers would have had to take the Fifth, which would have
looked bad in the press. Bad press would hurt negotiations
and would also affect the judge in a trial. So the idea was
to protect union members from trial. Keeping press out
was more important than vindicating legal rights here.
Press affects court and negotiation. [union attorney]
In papers, and in brief argument before Judge . ., the
company pointed out the public impact of the union's vio-
lent activities. The chambers conference which followed
resulted in a stipulated injunction, signed by the court, lim-
iting the number of pickets, and barring certain other ac-
tivities said the union caved in to avoid PR problems. It
gave in on everything to avoid the bad publicity of its acts.
[company attorney]
Doubts about what judges will do, when combined with the
pressures on company lawyers to get some kind of limitation and
the institutional interests of unions, play a role in the high number
of settlements of injunction actions. In some cases, the unions may
receive a windfall because a formal order could have been more se-
vere. On the other hand, such limitations, prior to the statutorily
provided hearing, may represent a surrender of statutory rights.
The community definition of violence under the statute may
reflect an accurate prediction of what trial and appellate courts
would in fact find. Yet in cases where the evidence was more
doubtful, unions and their attorneys acted in a similar manner.
The explanation seems to be based less on a sense of unease over
the possible judicial reaction or jointly shared definitions of vio-
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lence than on the perceived benefits of resolving the dispute
quickly and in a way that minimized costs, adverse publicity, and
conflict.
B. The Nature of the Settlement
What begins as a dispute about the union's right to picket is
transformed into a negotiation that centers on the location and
number of picketers that will be allowed. By reducing but not
eliminating picketing, both parties can avoid an all-or-nothing out-
come that would be unacceptable to either party.
The number of picketers permitted as the result of negotiation
or judicial order was influenced by at least two factors. First, the
number of picketers desired or agreed upon was somewhat related
to the number of pickets actually present. Second, there was a
tendency to split the difference between union and employer re-
quests, a not surprising result when a range of possible outcomes
exists.
In one case a limitation was reached by consent after negotia-
tion in chambers. The company lawyer noted that the number was
arrived at by considering the number of strikers (14 were usually
present), the width of the gates, and the fact that the company had
no full-time security force. In another case the police witness pro-
vided the critical testimony.
The court recessed and removed to [the judge's] chambers.
There was some talk at the outset of a TRO [temporary re-
straining order], but this was nixed by [the union's attor-
ney] . . . as a matter of law. The parties achieved a third
stipulation instead, limiting the number of pickets to
twelve .... How was the number arrived at? There had
been fifty at each gate, followed by mass picketing. The
number twelve came from the testimony of the police wit-
ness as to how many pickets could be controlled. There
was not much numerical negotiation. The number was
agreed upon by all. [company attorney]
The main issue in these kinds of cases is the number of
pickets. The rest of the orders usually ban conduct which
is already illegal, i.e., no violence, physical threats, etc.
Ten to fifteen pickets per gate is a good number, according
to unions. It allows them to be seen and to hassle traffic.
In [this case] ... there were upwards of fifty pickets before
the stipulation. Reduction to twelve was good for this rea-
son. [union attorney]
The parties offered numbers, the judge picked a middle
figure. [union attorney]
When numerical limits are sought, the union response is
that numbers don't matter, rather it's what the pickets do
which is important. But there is never a lengthy argument
over the number. It's more a matter of what they do on
the line. The issue is never exhaustively argued or briefed.
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It is not a big hang-up. The judge never even has to de-
cide-because the parties can usually agree. [company at-
torney]
In my point of view, I go in with the view towards trying to
get the maximum distance with the fewest number of pick-
ets consistent with our people being able to go in without
any delay. That is not to say that that has to be accommo-
dated by my client and in my [view] ... they have the right
to be there. To say, for example, they are entitled to have
eight or ten people walking between the posts of a thirty-
five-foot gate is one thing, but to say that they would be
entitled to thirty people there walking between the posts
of a thirty-foot gate would mean that they would essen-
tially be a foot apart walking two-by-two. There is no way
in the world you would drive a car through that. One of
the things, for example, I try to calculate the distance be-
tween them that will allow for a car to pass between them
without a great delay or difficulty. It depends on the width
of the gate. It also depends on their ability to advertise
their agreements in the areas approximate to the gate
without necessarily creating a parade within the gate area.
[company attorney]
Thus the use of judicial power to restrict the scope of labor's eco-
nomic weapons is transformed into a dispute about numbers.
C Transforming the Nature of the Issues
It is useful to view these events in terms of the lawyer's role
in transforming disputes of value into conflicts of interests
(Aubert, 1963). The picket line represents one of the union's basic
strengths, and an injunction has historically been seen as the as-
sertion of state power to infringe basic human or collective
rights.28 Furthermore, those rights are enshrined in the NLRA.
The protection of the right to picket thus involves deeply held
union values, the kind that seemingly could not be compromised
(Mather and Yngvesson, 1981: 778-780, 788-797). But the problem
is more complex, for the picket line is not the conflict-not the dis-
pute-even for the employer. Rather, the picket line is a weapon
in a broader conflict over working conditions. The receipt of an in-
junction strengthens the employer vis-A-vis the union in this eco-
nomic contest, just as the existence of a picket line is a vital
weapon of economic leverage for the union.
The battle over the injunction, then, is an element of a wider
struggle. The state and federal anti-injunction laws, which involve
only a part of the dispute, attempt to remove the state from inter-
fering with this economic contest. The existence of violence, the
28 Employees commonly believe that the number of picketers is impor-
tant either for self-protection or to carry out a function that is concededly un-
lawful, that is, to block the gates. Although it is rarely commented upon, pick-
eting also has the valuable effect of giving strikers something to do while
temporarily unemployed.
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adequacy and availability of the police, and the employer's compli-
ance with statutory pleading and proof requirements are not the
subjects of the underlying economic dispute. That dispute, consis-
tent with American ideology, is seen as a private dispute to be re-
solved by relative bargaining power. The fight over the existence
and scope of a picket line is of course directly related to the align-
ment of economic power. In this sense, some of the questions in
the injunction proceeding, especially over the numbers and loca-
tion of allowable picketers, are directly related to the underlying
dispute. In addition to the economic effects, the number of picket-
ers also displays collective strength and involvement of the union.
For the reasons stated, however, this economic battle, insofar as
the picket line is concerned, tends to be settled by an agreement
on the number of pickets to be allowed. Thus if the parties can
focus upon the number and location of picketers, a dispute of value
can be transformed into a conflict of interest and settled prior to a
judicial ruling.
The employer desires an injunction because of the economic
effect of picketing, although some employers do seek only a nu-
merical limit on picketers, as one company attorney explained:
There were two purposes in seeking a numerical limitation
of picketing. First, to reduce tensions and save money
spent on security at various company installations. Second,
to stop the violence.
Coming up empty-handed may affect the economic or emotional
balance of forces. The union, for its part, wishes (generally) to
avoid an injunction or even a numerical limit. Yet if pressures to
settle exist, the only focus can be on the number of picketers.
And, indeed, this is where settlement tends to occur. The em-
ployer can claim a victory, one that can be transmitted to company
official or stockholders, especially since the written law seemingly
makes it difficult to obtain an injunction. The union, on the other
hand, can settle, avoiding additional legal fees, without seeming to
have conceded on an issue of value. As one union lawyer percep-
tively noted:
The client union does not perceive negotiation [in a picket-
ing injunction case] as a surrender of statutory rights. But
it is a surrender of principle. The union chief is accounta-
ble to membership. He convinced the union to picket; a
settlement to eliminate picketing takes that away; better to
risk losing all than to look like a compromiser in front of
his own men. However, the usual numerical limitation
presents no problem. The pickets are still on the line.
There are no internal problems then.
The role of lawyers is of course crucial. Lawyers assist their
clients in employing or avoiding the imposition of restrictive for-
mal law as well as in "transforming" the underlying economic dis-
pute into statutory issues. But prior to the application of formal
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rules, lawyers can be said to transform the dispute again by focus-
ing upon tactical matters such as cost of litigation and delay and
the likely or unpredictable nature of judicial behavior. Lawyers
play a central role because settlements and consent orders help to
diffuse volatile situations.29
Highly volatile situations are created when companies attempt
to operate during strikes. Closing is often a matter of managerial
discretion, and the decision to remain open means that nonstrik-
ers, distributors, truck drivers, and even replacements may at-
tempt to cross picket lines, thus weakening the economic impact of
the strike. Tensions arise from the irritation employees feel when
the workplace remains open during a strike.
Lawyers generally agreed that the filing of an injunction peti-
tion was primarily an indication of an employer's intention to re-
main in operation during a strike. The injunction or settlement
helped to diffuse emotion, but worker anger stemmed from the
employer's initial decision to remain in operation.3 0
A company trying to keep shipping over a strike usually
needs an injunction. If the company is forced to shut
down, no injunction is required because the union pickets
are less tense. In this case, incidents picked up when the
union saw the company was continuing to ship goods in
and out. [company attorney]
Where a plant remains open, strikers are irritated. In this
case, the independent truckers stirred things up. Super-
visors had been running the plant, too. In this kind of
case, problems are more serious on the picket line. Yet,
section 807 does deter injunctions. Judges don't want to be
policemen. The Penal Code rules can be as easily applied.
[union attorney]
Nevertheless, attorneys reported they were generally unaware
of the actual effect of an injunction or an agreed upon stipulation.
Although company attorneys felt "an injunction is a great moral
victory and hurts a strike," few cited any concrete effects of the
injunction action and its resolution.3 1 This may result from the
often limited involvement of attorneys in economic disputes and
obviously reveals the shortcoming of a study focused only on attor-
neys. One union attorney noted that court intervention and limi-
tation might have a demoralizing effect on strikers, but he did not
feel the cost to morale was as great today. Attorneys generally did
29 This formulation was suggested by Lynn Mather.
30 The ability to stay open during a strike is considerably enhanced by
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision permitting the permanent replacement of
strikers: NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); see
Atleson, 1983: chap. 1.
31 Since the picket line is only one weapon in an ongoing economic con-
test, it would be difficult to "isolate the influence of injunctions from other
factors which may have had a part. .. " (Witte, 1932: 120-122).
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feel, however, that injunctions "cool down the situation immedi-
ately." One company lawyer said,
I think what they like to do with the least amount of inter-
ference with the right to peacefully picket, they want to al-
low the thing to settle-to quiet the thing down. That's
the point of most of the injunctions I have seen granted. It
is not to clobber one side or the other to create an advan-
tage for one side or the other in the process.
The result of negotiated settlements to the union is, at least in
the abstract, a diminution of its collective strength, although con-
straints also push employers to seek less than a judge might grant.
The "middle ground" toward which pressures direct both parties
may constitute a discounting of employee rights. Unless it could
be said in every case that the employer would be successful, the
pressures toward settlement are not necessarily neutral in impact.
Nevertheless, parties often have mutual, or at least intersecting,
interests in seeking to limit the effects of conflict.
To union lawyers and their clients, union officers, picketing
may often be less important than one might believe. Militance on
the picket line is not necessarily shared by the union's leadership.
The settlements, though, do not necessarily reflect a lessened
militance or valuation of picketing, for what unions concede is not
technically the right to picket but rather the unilateral right to de-
termine the number and locations of picketers.
Picketing is primarily designed to notify the public, nonstrik-
ers, and replacements that a strike is in progress. When this is so,
the number of picketers may not be a crucial factor. Certainly
union lawyers seemed to view the situation through this instru-
mental lens. Historically, however, unions have viewed the
number of picketers as important, either for actual or perceived
self-protection. If one purpose of picketing is to build or display
group solidarity and morale or to cause economic disruption even
for a short period, the number of picketers would also seem to be
important. Whatever the precise purpose or purposes of the pick-
eting in these cases, however, unions were routinely willing to sub-
ject the issue of the number and location of picketers to negotia-
tion rather than permit a judge to make this determination.
The situation might be different if the union perceived that
the stakes were higher. Thus if the very life of the union were
threatened, or if the union thought the employer was trying to de-
stroy it, the union might be unwilling to waive procedural rights,
such as the statutory hearing, if for no other reason than to maxi-
mize the economic cost to the employer prior to an injunction. In
less extreme situations like those studied here, attorneys were able
to produce settlements despite evidence of high emotion and even
violence as alleged in employer petitions.
72 LEGAL COMMUNITY AND DISPUTE TRANSFORMATION
VII. CONCLUSION
This study has been an inquiry into legal culture. Lawyers in
picketing injunction cases represent clients in situations of great
emotion and immediacy who nevertheless must continue to deal
with each other on a day-to-day basis. Similarly, the small group
of labor lawyers regularly interact with one another and depend
on their reputations for trustworthiness and reasonableness. The
lawyers strive to create predictability and to transform conflicts of
values into disputes of interests so that volatile situations can be
diffused quickly and resolved.
Although these lawyers never characterized themselves as
mediators, the behavior they described-seeking settlements and
"cooling-out" situations of conflict-is consistent with that role. Is-
sues of principle are changed into conflicts of interests, narrowed
by the explicit statutory boundaries and the implicit norms created
by lawyers, so that settlements occur. It is clear that such an
approach offers substantial benefits to attorneys and their clients
and that attorneys are generally comfortable with a mediated form
of resolution. The remaining questions, ripe for study, are how cli-
ents perceive the method of resolution and what costs are imposed
by informal compromise in the shadow of uncertain judicial be-
havior.
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